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Introduction
The term Political Budget Cycles (PBC) refers to the reduction in 
taxes or to the expansion of public spending of the deficit or debt 
immediately prior to elections by the governing party in an attempt 
to favor its re-election (Drazen, 2008b). Before the arrival of PBC 
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A B S T R A C T
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law has affected 
Political Budget Cycles generated by Spanish local governments. Specifically, we study whether the evolution 
of debt, budget deficit, capital spending and current spending over the electoral cycle has changed after the 
introduction of this law. We use a sample of 132 Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
(including the provincial capitals) during the period 1995-2009. Our results show that the Budgetary Stability 
Law has avoided electoral cycles in debt. On the contrary, the adoption of this law has not mitigated the 
incumbents’ incentives to manipulate deficit, capital spending and current spending with electoral aims. 
Nevertheless, it has caused a change in the way in which mayors manipulate fiscal policy over the electoral 
cycle. The opportunistic expansion covered both preelectoral year and the electoral year before the 
implementation of this fiscal rule, while after that, deficit and spending increases are confined in the election 
year.
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Comportamiento electoral y estabilidad presupuestaria
R E S U M E N
En este trabajo analizamos la influencia de la entrada en vigor de la Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria en los 
Ciclos Políticos Presupuestarios generados por los gobiernos locales españoles. En concreto, estudiamos si la 
evolución de la deuda, del déficit, del gasto de capital y del gasto corriente a lo largo del ciclo electoral se ha 
visto modificada tras la introducción de dicha ley. Para ello utilizamos una muestra formada por 
132 municipios españoles con más de 50.000 habitantes (incluidas las capitales de provincia) durante el 
periodo 1995-2009. Nuestros resultados muestran que la Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria ha evitado la 
creación de Ciclos Políticos Presupuestarios en la deuda. Por el contrario, la aprobación de dicha ley no 
ha atenuado los incentivos de los políticos para manipular el déficit, el gasto de capital y el gasto corriente con 
la finalidad de permanecer en el poder, si bien sí que ha supuesto un cambio en la forma en la que los alcaldes 
manipulan estas variables a lo largo del ciclo electoral. Antes de la aprobación de la ley se observaban 
expansiones oportunistas tanto en el año preelectoral como en el electoral, mientras que tras la entrada en 
vigor de la misma los incrementos del déficit, del gasto de capital y del gasto corriente se concentran en el año 
en el que se celebran las elecciones.
© 2012 ASEPUC. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos reservados.
I N F O R M A C I Ó N  D E L  A R T Í C U L O :
Historia del artículo:
Recibido el 18 de octubre de 2012 
Aceptado el 22 de octubre de 2012
Keywords:
Budgetary Stability Law
Electoral cycles
Local governments
JEL Classification: 
E6, H3, H7
Palabras clave: 
Ley de Estabilidad Presupuestaria
Ciclos electorales
Gobiernos locales
Clasificación JEL: 
E6, H3, H7
theories, studies on political cycles merely analyzed the effect of 
elections on the cyclic behavior of macroeconomic variables. In 
recent decades, however, the literature on electoral cycles has 
shifted its focus to budgetary variables, mainly because of the 
absence of empirical data supporting the existence of Political 
Business Cycles in countries (Drazen, 2008a).
Recent studies on PBC have started to address factors that 
determine the magnitude of the electoral cycle. One factor detected 
has been budgetary stability rules, since governments that are 
clearly limited by these rules will find it harder to increase spending 
or cut taxes prior to elections (Alt and Rose, 2007). 
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the models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), who were 
the first to focus on the role of fiscal policy as a cycle generator, the 
origin of PBC theories. The models developed by the authors 
mentioned are based information asymmetries between voters and 
governors regarding the competence of the latter. They assume that 
voters have an interest in electing the most competent leaders, 
which are those able to provide the most public goods with the 
lowest level of revenue. Since voters cannot directly observe the 
competence of the governor they have to infer this from the results 
of the fiscal policies. The electorate, therefore, prefers candidates 
who incur in higher spending or provide tax reductions prior to 
elections since this is a sign of their high level of competence.
Most studies on PBC have aimed mainly to provide empirical 
confirmation of the Rogoff and Sibert theory, and recent years have 
seen a wealth of papers that seek to identify the determinants of the 
size of political cycles. These studies make up part of the literature 
on conditioned PBC that analyzes which factors inf luence the 
incentives or the capacity of politicians to generate electoral cycles. 
Among the factors analyzed are the decision of a leader to stand for 
re-election, his political strength, the margin of victory expected in 
the forthcoming elections, the level of transparency and the 
existence of fiscal rules that limit or inhibit the deficit. 
Regarding the decision to run for re-election or not, Besley and 
Case (1995), Rose (2006) and Alt and Rose (2007) examine whether 
governors who do not run for re-election generate a shorter electoral 
cycle than those who do. The results show that running for reelection 
or not does not affect a governor’s opportunistic behavior, even 
though it was expected that those not seeking re-election would 
have fewer incentives to manipulate fiscal policy tools. 
In terms of political strength, Geys (2007) reports that opportu-
nist manipulation in election years increases the more parties there 
are in the government. 
Elsewhere, Alt and Rose (2007) and Aidt, Veiga and Veiga (2011) 
find greater PBC when governors believe the elections will be tight 
affairs. 
With regard to transparency, Alt and Lassen (2006a; 2006b) 
study the relation with electoral cycles, concluding that these are 
greater in less transparent countries. Likewise, Shi and Svensson 
(2002) indicate that the percentage of informed voters influences 
PBC.
Finally, many authors have examined the impact of budget 
stability laws on PBC. Rose (2006) analyzes whether budgetary 
regulations limit politicians’ capacity to manipulate the budget to 
favor their re-election. Using a sample of American States, she 
concludes that only very strict fiscal regulations reduce electoral 
cycles in expenditure and deficit. Again with a sample of American 
States, Alt and Rose (2007) show budgetary stability regulations are 
associated with smaller increases in expenditure in the run-up to 
elections. According to these authors, the result was expected since 
budgetary stability regulations limit politicians’ capacity to generate 
electoral cycles.
Among the studies on the influence of budgetary regulations on 
manipulation of budgets caused by elections, some scholars focus on 
the effects of the Treaty of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth 
Pact on PBC generated by the EU member country governments. 
Buti and Van den Noord (2004), Mink and de Haan (2006), Von 
Hagen (2006) and Efthyvoulou (2011) report that the demands of 
budgetary discipline deriving from the Stability and Growth Pact 
have not lessened politicians’ incentives to manipulate fiscal policy 
tools when an election looms, and they find evidence for the 
existence of PBC following the adoption of the Pact. 
Hence, application of the Stability and Growth Pact has not led to 
the disappearance of electoral cycles. However, according to Von 
Hagen (2006), electoral cycles are affected by the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Their results indicate that during the period of economic convergence 
(between 1992 and 1998) no opportunist manipulation was observed 
To date, most studies have examined the influence of the Stability 
and Growth Pact on the cycles generated by the central governments 
of the euro countries. (Buti and Van den Noord, 2004; Mink and de 
Haan, 2006; Von Hagen, 2006; Efthyvoulou, 2011). Nevertheless, we 
should consider that one consequence of the Pact has been that 
many countries have brought in budgetary rules to limit the 
spending of regional and local administrations. The reason for this is 
that for a country to comply with the Pact all the administrations, 
not just central government, have to chip in if the limits established 
are not to be exceeded. 
The purpose of our study is to determine how Spanish local 
governments’ opportunist behavior has been affected by the 2001 
Budgetary Stability Act, which puts strict limits on the deficit and 
debt public administrations are allowed to run into. This law 
attempts to assure municipalities’ financial health (under the terms 
of the European System of National and Regional Accounts, SEC-95). 
One of the main motives of the Act was, indeed, to help “accelerate 
the reduction in debt” of these entities. 
Specifically, our aim here is to study the effect that the Budgetary 
Stability Act (BSA) has had on the size of the PBC. We compare the 
impact of election dates on municipal debt, deficit and capital 
expenditure and current expenditure before and after the arrival of 
above-mentioned Act. Empirical literature on PBC at subnational 
levels reports that politicians manipulate these variables in order to 
increase their chances of re-election (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Veiga 
and Veiga, 2007; Bastida, Beyaert, and Benito, 2012).
This paper contributes to the literature by showing for the first 
time the effect of a budgetary regulation, deriving the Stability and 
Growth Pact, on how local governments manipulate debt, deficit, 
capital expenditure and current expenditure during the electoral 
cycle. 
This paper also shows the evolution of debt, deficit, capital 
expenditure and municipal current expenditure in each of the years 
comprising the electoral cycle, unlike other studies, which only take 
into account the election year itself. We can, therefore, analyze not 
just whether the application of the Act has affected the electoral 
cycle but how it has done so. In other words, it may be that this law 
has not eliminated the electoral cycle but has influenced how it is 
generated. 
Our findings show that application of the BSA has had an effect 
on political budgetary cycles, although the effect varies depending 
on the variable analyzed. While electoral cycles for debt have 
disappeared following the introduction of the BSA, the cycles 
generated for deficit, capital expenditure and current expenditure 
persist. In these three cases the law has led to a change in how 
politicians manipulate them during the electoral cycle. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a review of the 
literature on conditioned PBC. Section 3 provides a description of the 
sample, we define the variables used and we specify the econometric 
model. Section 4 analyzes the results and Section 5 concludes.
Conditioned political budget cycles
The first theoretical model on Political Business Cycles was 
developed by Nordhaus (1975). According to this author, govern-
ments manipulate monetary policy to create political cycles in 
macroeconomic results (growth, employment and inflation) and to 
increase the likelihood of their remaining in power. According 
to this model, voters’ expectations are formed by adaptation. The 
implication is that governors who manipulate the economy by 
bringing in expansive policies before elections are rewarded by the 
voters even though their policies may undergo a volte face after the 
elections. 
Later models incorporated rational expectations, i.e. they 
assumed voters would not be systematically taken in. These include 
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in election years. Awareness that non compliance with the conditions 
of Maastricht would mean exclusion from the European Monetary 
Union led voters to be more supportive of fiscal discipline. Therefore, 
cycles disappeared during the economic convergence period. Given 
the above, Von Hagen (2006) concludes that for budgetary regulations 
to be effective they have to fulfill two conditions: breaking them 
should imply a cost and citizens should perceive this.
As we have seen, most works have been of national scope, 
analyzing the cycles generated by central governments in the 
eurozone. They examine the effect of the application of the Stability 
and Growth Pact on opportunistic behavior of central governments. 
In their attempts to meet the requirements of the Pact, many 
European governments have established budgetary regulations 
which also limit the deficits of sub-national administrations. 
While it would seem to be of importance to analyze whether the 
budgetary regulations stemming from the Stability and Growth Pact 
have restricted local governments’ capacity to create electoral 
cycles, very few studies have addressed this issue. The only study to 
broach the question of the effect the entry of the Budgetary Stability 
Act has had on Political Budgetary Cycles in Spain is that of García, 
Prado and Cuadrado (2011), who show that the electoral cycle for 
debt has waned since the introduction of the law. As the study in 
question only looks at the use of debt for opportunistic goals, we 
believe that it is worthwhile extending the study to other budgetary 
variables that have been affected by this law. 
Methodology
Sample
The sample comprises 132 Spanish municipalities of over 
50,000 inhabitants (including the provincial capitals) during the 
period 1995-2009. It therefore covers the four municipal elections of 
1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007. 
The ensuing data panel includes variables of financial, political 
and demographic natures. The municipal financial data were taken 
from the Spanish Public Sector Economic Database (BADESPE) 
and from the Ministry of the Finance and Public Administrations. 
They have been deflated using the Consumer Price Index prepared 
by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). Statistical sources 
granting us access to political information were the Spanish Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Ministry for Territorial Policy. Finally, the INE 
and the Economic Annual of “La Caixa” has provided the information 
needed to construct the demographic variables.
Variables
The main interest of our study is to analyze whether the entry of 
the BSA has reduced the size of the PBC. We define four dependent 
variables: debt per capita (debtpc), deficit per capita (deficitpc), 
capital expenditure per capita (capitalexppc) and current expen-
diture per capita (currentexppc). These were chosen on the basis of 
the literature on electoral cycles at subnational level as possible 
tools used by politicians to sway citizens’ votes (Khemani, 2004; 
Medina and Lema, 2004; Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Drazen and Eslava, 
2010; García, Prado and Cuadrado, 2011). 
The effect of the electoral calendar is captured by three binary 
variables: preelec which takes the value 1 for the year before the 
elections and 0 in the remaining cases, elec which takes the value 
1 for the year of the elections and 0 in the remaining cases and 
postelec which takes the value 1 for the year after the elections and 
0 otherwise. Using this procedure we can observe the behavior of 
the budgetary variables in each stage of the electoral cycle, 
something which would not have been possible if we had defined 
only a binary variable that took two values: election year and non 
election year. Recent studies that use the former procedure are 
Foucault, Thierry and Paty (2008), Rose (2006) and Alt and Rose 
(2007). In order to consider the effect of the BSA, we have defined 
the variable BSA, which takes the value 1 in the years 2003-2009 and 
0 in the remaining cases. Although this law came into effect in 
January 2002, the first budgets to be drawn up under it were in 2003. 
As well as the variables already described, we have considered a 
series of control variables such as political strength, the political 
sign of the mayor, population density, population, unemployment 
rate, tax revenue and transfers received. 
Aspects like political strength or political sign are considered 
determinants of the municipal financial situation. Hence, we take 
into account these variables to control for political effects.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) maintain that coordination problems in 
fragmented governments may suppose high costs, an argument 
referred to in the literature as the “Roubini and Sachs weak govern-
ment hypothesis” (RSH). We include the variable strength in order to 
analyze it.
The variable politicsign has been included in the model given the 
common assumption that progressive parties favor increasing public 
expenditure while conservative parties tend to reduce it (Seitz, 2000; 
Tellier, 2006). Cusack (1997) defines this idea through the concept 
“political parties matters” (PPM). However, ideology may not be a 
relevant factor in explaining the municipal financial situation. 
According to Benito, Bastida and Muñoz (2010), specific characteristics 
of municipalities may force local governments into certain policies to 
improve specific situations, regardless of their political sign.
Population density is included in the model in the variable 
popden, even though the literature has not clearly shown its 
influence on the municipal financial situation1. 
We have also included the variable population, for the munici-
pality’s population. Hempel (1973), Hulten and Peterson (1984) and 
Rivers and Yates (1997) hold that population growth leads to 
increased municipal expenditure. Likewise, Mitchell (1967), Pogue 
(1970), Escudero and Prior (2002), Vallés and Zárete (2001) find a 
positive relation between debt level and population.
Some studies (Holcombe and Williams, 2008; Carruthers and 
Ulfarsson, 2008; Foucault, Thierry and Paty, 2008) include un-
employ ment rate as a variable (unemployment) to explain local 
government expenditure. Holcombe and Williams (2008), for 
example, report that municipal expenditure is positively related to 
employment rate. It is also likely that an increase in unemployment 
rate brings with it an increase in deficits, which in the long run 
causes greater debt (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001).
We also consider the effect of transfers proceeding from higher 
level governments since it is expected that these will lead to an 
increase in local expenditure (Dahlberg, Mörk, Rattsø and Hanna 
2008).The variable total transfers per capita (totaltransfpc) will be 
used as an explanatory variable in debt regression; the variable 
capital transfers per capita (capitaltransfpc) will be used as an 
explanatory variable in the capital expenditures regression and the 
variable current transfers (currenttransfpc) in the current expen-
ditures regression. 
Finally, we include the variable taxrevenuepc since it is generally 
assumed that higher taxes increase total expenditure (Carruthers 
and Ulfarsson, 2008). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that an 
increase in tax levels may not necessarily suppose an increase in the 
total non financial expenditure. In fact, if a municipality has an 
excessive level of debt it may use part of the revenue from taxes to 
better its financial situation. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) state that 
1 Some authors find that per capita public expenditure tends to increase when 
popu lation density increases (Ladd and Yinger, 1991; Ladd, 1994; Holcombe and 
Williams, 2008). Others, meanwhile, report the opposite (Pettersson-Lidbom, 
2001; Burchell and Mukherji, 2003; Litman, 2004; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2008).
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there is a substitution effect between taxes collected and debt 
assumed (Table 1). 
Model specification 
To analyze the effect of the BSA on the PBC the following model is 
estimated:
yit =  ayit-1+ b1preelecit + b2elecit + b3postelecit + l1preelecit · BSAt +  
+ l2elecit · BSAt + l3postelecit · BSAt + gXit + ci + «it 
(1)
 
where subindex i is the municipalities, t is the year, yit is the depen-
dent variable and yit-1 is the lagged value of the dependent variable. 
Xit is the control variables vector (strength, politicsign, popden, 
population, unemployment, taxreveneuepc, totaltransfpc, current-
transfpc and capitaltransfpc). ci is the individual effect of the 
municipality, y «it is the error term. 
The model also includes the variables of interest in our study, i.e. 
the cycle variables (preelec, elec and postelec) and the interaction 
terms between these binary variables and the binary variable BSA. 
The effect of the electoral calendar on the budgetary variables prior to 
the BSA is shown in the coefficients of the cycle variables (preelec, elec 
and postelec) although the impact of the elections on the budgetary 
variables after the BSA came in is ref lected by the sum of the 
coefficients of these variables and the interaction terms. Ascertaining 
if the cycle has really changed after the law came in is done by 
observing the significance of the coefficients of the interaction terms. 
If these are significant we can conclude that electoral cycles observed 
as from 2003 differ from those occurring prior to the law.
We expect to find smaller electoral cycles after the BSA came in, 
since according to the literature, the fiscal regulations limiting or 
prohibiting deficit should diminish politicians’ capacity to mani pulate 
fiscal policy tools, and so prevent the appearance of PBC (Rose, 2006).
The estimation method used is the Generalized Moments Method 
(GMM), developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Results
Table 2 shows the results obtained by the model described in the 
previous section.
The second column gives the estimations to evaluate the effect of 
the entry of BSA on the PBC on debt. Note that the coefficients of the 
cycle variables should be interpreted in relation to the base year, i.e. 
the second year after elections.
In terms of debt, the positive and significant coefficient of 
variable preelec indicates that prior to the BSA, local governments 
took on more debt in the year prior to an election. On the other hand, 
coefficients of variables elec and postelec are negative and significant, 
suggesting that in an election year and the year after debt levels 
decrease, albeit very slightly during the election year itself, with the 
greatest adjustment occurring in the year after. From the above, we 
can state that prior to the BSA there was an electoral cycle for debt 
characterized by a considerable increase in debt in the year 
preceding elections and an adjustment during the year following the 
elections. In contrast, after the law, no electoral cycles are detected 
for municipal debt. The significant coefficient for the interaction 
term preelecxBSA indicates that following the entry of the BSA, the 
Table 1
Definition of variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Source Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
debtpc Debt in euros per capita (real € 2001)1 Spanish Ministry of the Finance  
 and Public Administrations
420.06 228.55 .00 1,764.66
deficitpc Budgetary deficit in euros per capita (real € 2001) BADESPE (1995-2002) database  
  and the Spanish Ministry  
of the Finance and Public 
Administrations (2003-2009)
–17.98 101.87 –1711.19 476.77
capitalexppc Capital expenditure in euros per capita (real € 2001) 154.42 91.87 6.19 754.43
currentexppc Current expenditure in euros per capita (real € 2001) 455.07 138.08 152.29 1,172.91
preelec Pre-election year
Takes value 1 in the pre-election year and 0 otherwise
Own elaboration .20 .40 .00 1.00
elec Election years 
Takes value 1 in election years and 0 otherwise
.26 .44 .00 1.00
postelec Post-election years
Takes value 1 in post-election years and 0 otherwise
.27 .44 .00 1.00
BSA Budgetary Stability Act
Value 0 for all the years between 1995 and 2002
Value 1 for 2003 and thereafter
.47 .50 .00 1.00
strength Political strength 
Value 0: municipal government in coalition  
 of 2 or more political parties.
Value 1: formed by a single-party government
Spanish Ministry of Internal  
  Affairs and Ministry  
for Territorial Policy
.50 .50 .00 1.00
politicsign Political sign of the governing party 
Left-wing = 0;
Right-wing = 1
.48 .50 .00 1.00
popden Population density of municipality  Spanish National Institute  
 of Statistics 
2,529.22 3,405.67 41.22 19,273.20
population Population of municipality 167,855.10 306,810.10 26,312.00 3,255,944.00
unemployment Unemployment rate in municipality Economic Annual of “La Caixa” 5.17 2.06 1.40 15.60
totaltransfpc Total transfers received from regional and central  
 government in euros per capita (real € 2001)
BADESPE (1995-2002) database  
  and the Spanish Ministry  
of the Finance and Public 
Administrations (2003-2009)
256.44 102.86 92.17 862.06
capitaltransfpc Capital transfers received from regional and central 
government in euros per capita (real € 2001)
47.32 48.28 .00 384.67
currenttransfpc Current transfers received from regional and central 
government in euros per capita (real € 2001)
209.45 87.75 65.74 829.67
taxrevenuepc Tax revenue in euros per capita (real € 2001) 411.42 151.11 161.72 1,220.83
1 Budgetary data have been deflated using the Consumer Price Index of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics.
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year prior to elections sees a reduction in debt of €3.27 per capita 
(€13.54 – €16.81 = –€3.27). With respect to election year we obser-
ve how the coefficient of variable elecxBSA is not significant, 
implying that the behavior debt in the election year after the entry 
of BSA does not differ significantly than that shown prior to the law. 
The significant coefficient of the interaction term postelecxBSA 
indicates that the year after elections debt falls by €6.36 per capita 
(–€12.31 + €5.95 = –€6.36). Hence, the results above show how 
following the entry of the BSA debt has ceased to be manipulated 
since it does not increase in either pre-election or election years. 
Figure 1 shows how, prior to the BSA, local governments 
generated electoral cycles for debt, increasing it significantly in the 
year before the elections and making adjustments in the year after 
the election. Nevertheless, we observe how the line describing debt 
behavior during electoral cycle after the entry of the law is almost 
f lat , indicating that opportunist manipulation of debt has 
disappeared. Hence, the BSA has avoided the appearance of electoral 
cycles in debt in Spanish municipalities.
In terms of the variable deficit, the coefficient of variable preelec 
indicates that prior to the law, budgetary deficit increased by 
€18.81 per capita in the pre-election year with respect to the base 
year. In contrast, the significant coefficient of the interaction term 
preelecxBSA suggests that since the BSA came in, there is a reduction 
in deficit of €28.49 per capita (€18.81 – €47.30 = –€28.49) in 
pre-election years. 
Secondly, we observe how the increase of deficit in an election 
year has doubled since the law came in. The value of the coefficient 
associated to elec indicates that the deficit increased €27.62 per 
capita in election years prior to the law. In contrast, since the law the 
electoral expansion of the deficit has been €55.52 per capita 
(€27.62 + €27.90 = €55.52), as is ref lected by the sum of the 
coefficients of the variables elec and elecxBSA. These increases in 
deficit in election years in the two periods analyzed are statistically 
different as the coefficient of the interaction term is significant. 
Finally, in both the period before and after the law came in deficit 
increased in the post-electoral year, even though this deficit 
expansion is much lower than that observed in the election years in 
both periods. Specifically, the coefficient for the variable postelec 
indicates that the deficit increased €4.47 per capita in the years 
after elections prior to the BSA. The increase in def icit in 
post-election years after the law came in has been €17.92 per capita 
(€4.47 + €13.45 = €17.92), as is indicated by the sum of the 
coefficients of the variable postelec and the variable postelecxBSA. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of the electoral calendar on budgetary 
deficit before and after the BSA came into effect.
As the graph shows, prior to the BSA, opportunist expansion of the 
deficit covered both the election and the pre-election years. This 
opportunist use of the deficit has not disappeared with the entry of the 
law but is now concentrated in the election year. Unlike what occurred 
before the law, deficit is reduced significantly in the pre-election year. 
Table 2
Estimation of regressions
Dependent variables debtpc deficitpc capitalexppc currentexppc
debtpc(t-1) .93*** (113.76)
deficitpc(t-1) .15*** (37.64)
capitalexppc (t-1) .33*** (40.65)
currentexppc (t-1) .65*** (139.90)
preelec 13.54*** (15.60) 18.81*** (18.35) 16.92*** (18.98) –7.56*** (–19.01)
elec –2.12* (–1.89) 27.62*** (18.52) 21.42*** (19.68) –6.21*** (–13.60)
postelec –12.31*** (–12.74) 4.47*** (3.70) –17.20*** (–17.80) –3.13*** (–7.61)
preelecxBSA –16.81*** (–14.76) –47.30*** (–28.16) –9.66*** (–5.58) 17.07*** (38.57)
elecxBSA 1.99 (1.53) 27.90*** (13.95) 2.63* (1.80) 33.61*** (60.16)
postelecxBSA 5.95*** (4.33) 13.45*** (16.02) 3.29*** (3.35) 9.96*** (16.02)
strength 9.27 (1.28) 18.00*** (5.44) 26.56*** (4.02) 9.18*** (3.36)
politicsign –10.64*** (–2.92) –13.43*** (–4.86) 7.79*** (1.89) –13.15*** (–4.42)
popden –.03*** (–6.36) .03*** (13.20) .02*** (5.40) .01*** (3.19)
population .0003*** (22.98) .0002*** (15.83) .00008*** (8.63) .0002*** (26.66)
unemployment 11.85*** (24.86) 11.74*** (35.41) 1.69*** (4.93) 3.90*** (26.14)
totaltransfpc .02*** (2.87)
capitaltransfpc .57*** (53.68)
currenttransfpc .34*** (54.32)
taxrevenuepc –.15*** (–24.44) .19*** (26.68) .17*** (34.54)
 m2 (p-value) –.24 (.807) –.80 (.421) –.62 (.537) 1.70 (.089)
 Hansen (p-value) 121.33 (1.000) 120.12 (.762) 124.51 (1.000) 123.18 (1.000)
 Observations 1,654 1,662 1,663 1,666
Significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%. Z values in brackets.
The tests performed confirm the model’s validity: the test proposed by Arellano and Bond (m2) tests for the absence of second order serial correlation and the Hansen cons-
traint over-identification test verifies the absence of correlation between tools and the error term.
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Figure 1. Electoral cycle for debt.
60
40
20
0
–20
–40
 base year pre-election year election year post-election year base year
Period prior to the Budgetary Stability Act
Period after the Budgetary Stability Act 
Figure 2. Electoral cycle for deficit.
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So, our results agree with those of Buti and Van den Noord (2004), who 
show that after the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact, eurozone 
governments have adopted restrictive fiscal policies in non election 
years in order to give an expansive fiscal policy in the election years.
As observed above, the prohibition on getting into debt laid down 
in the BSA has prevented politicians manipulating debt to favor their 
re-election, although it has not prevented the appearance of 
electoral cycles in non financial deficit. 
The BSA meant that capital expenditure could only be financed 
by non financial revenues and not by debt. This explains why before 
the law one could find electoral cycles for debt which have since 
disappeared. However, given that local governments wish to 
continue to increase capital expenditure before elections, due to its 
high visibility to the electorate (Rosenberg, 1992; Veiga and 
Veiga2007a; Kneebone and Mckenzie, 2001), they use deficit 
expansion in the election year. So the law has not managed to 
mitigate electoral cycles for deficit. 
In short, even though the law prohibits non financial deficit, local 
administrations have passed balanced budgets but have then 
liquidated them with important deficit amounts, so giving rise to 
the huge, unsupportable accumulated debt with suppliers and 
creditors of recent years.
As for capital expenditure, the posit ive and signif icant 
coefficients of variables preelec and elec in the fourth column of 
Table 2 indicate that before the law came into effect there was an 
increase in this expenditure in pre-election years (€16.92) and in the 
election years themselves (€21.42). Once the law came in, the 
expansion of capital expenditure occurred in both the pre-election 
and the election years. In both periods there was a reduction in 
expenditure in the post-election year. However, as figure 3 shows, 
although the BSA has not eliminated the cycle for capital 
expenditure, it has changed the way in which politicians mani pulate 
it to serve re-election ends. Specifically, the increase in expenditure 
in the pre-election years prior to the law was almost double that 
observed after its entry. The magnitude of opportunist distortion 
has, moreover, been higher in election years since the law came in.
The results in the fifth column highlight that before the entry of 
the BSA there were no electoral cycles in current expenditure. The 
negative coefficients of variables preelec, elec and postelec indicate 
that in the pre-election, election and post-election years current 
expenditure is lower than for the base year, i.e. mayors do not 
increase this expenditure on account of the elections. However, 
electoral cycles in current expenditure have been observed since 
the entry of the law, because this budgetary variable shows a 
considerable increase in the election year (–€6,21 + €33,61= €27,40). 
Figure 4 shows how after the entry of the BSA this budgetary tool 
has been used to influence citizens’ votes. Indeed, prior to the law 
no opportunist manipulation of current expenditure is seen. As the 
graph shows, the line describing the evolution of expenditure for 
the period between one election and the next is almost flat, which, 
according to Alt and Rose (2007) is indicative of the absence of PBC.
As regards the other independent variables, the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is significant and positive in all the 
regressions, indicating that municipal debt, deficit and expen diture 
in any given year is largely explained by that of the previous year.
For the variable strength, the results indicate that governments 
holding an absolute majority spend more and show higher levels of 
deficit than coalition and minority governments. The results do not 
confirm, therefore, the Roubini and Sachs (1989) hypothesis for a 
weak government, according to which the fragmentation of power 
at government level leads to higher public expenditure. One possible 
explanation is that the lack of agreement in minority governments 
may sometimes prevent getting spending projects under way.
The estimated coefficients for the variable politicsign reflect that 
progressive governments contribute significantly to increasing 
current expenditure, deficit and debt. Capital expenditure is, 
however, higher under conservative governments — a finding which 
agrees partially with PPI theory that left-wing governments spend 
more and take on more debt.
Population density (popden) has a positive impact on deficit, 
capital expenditure and current expenditure. This in line with the 
empirical literature, which states that population density positively 
affects municipal per capita expenditure (Ladd and Yinger, 1991; 
Ladd, 1994; Holcombe and Williams, 2008). In contrast, it has a 
negative effect on the level of debt. From Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), 
municipalities with higher population densities are expected to 
have higher debt levels, due to the effect of economies of scale.
Population size (population) has a significant, although slight, 
impact on the financial variables studied. Estimations show that the 
greater the population, the higher the per capita debt, capital expen-
diture, current expenditure and deficit.
As expected, unemployment (unemployment) has a positive effect 
on deficit, debt and both expenditure categories. 
In terms of transfers, the positive and significant coefficients for 
the totaltransfpc, capitaltransfpc and currenttransfpc in the regres-
sions on debt, capital expenditure and current expenditure suggest 
that local governments increase public expenditure and debt when 
there is an increase of funds from transfers. 
Finally, we find a positive impact of tax revenue (taxrevenuepc) 
on both expenditure categories, indicating that municipalities are 
using tax revenue money to increase expenditure. We also observe a 
substitution effect between tax revenue and debt, since the 
coefficient for the variable taxrevenuepc shows that local govern-
ments which collect more taxes have less debt.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the Budgetary 
Stability Act has influenced the Political Budget Cycles generated by 
Spanish local governments. We took as our basis information on the 
debt, deficit, capital expenditure and current expenditure of 
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Figure 3. Electoral cycle for capital expenditure.
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Figure 4. Electoral cycle for current expenditure.
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132 Spanish municipalities of over 50,000 inhabitants (including the 
provincial capitals) during the period 1995-2009.
The results show that after the introduction of the law local 
governments have ceased to manipulate debt as a means of increa-
sing their chances of remaining in power. In contrast, the introduc-
tion of the Budgetary Stability Act has not reduced the size of the 
deficit cycle, although it has led to a change in its expansion pattern 
over the course of the electoral cycle. Prior to the law, deficit 
increased during the pre-election and the election years. After the 
law, deficit decreased in the year before the elections and increased 
considerably during the election year itself. Similarly, the electoral 
cycles in capital expenditure have not disappeared as a result of the 
law, although there has been a reduction in this expenditure in the 
pre-election year and increase of the same in election years since 
the law came in. In terms of current expenditure, unlike what was 
happening before 2003, since the Budgetary Stability Act came in, 
mayors have started to manipulate this budgetary variable to 
enhance their possibilities of reelection and there has been an 
increase in this expenditure in election years.
In short, the Budgetary Stability Act has avoided the creation of 
Political Budgetary Cycles in debt, but it has not reduced politicians’ 
capacity to manipulate the other budgetary variables analyzed. 
Although it has not eliminated electoral cycles in deficit, capital 
expenditure or current expenditure, it has led to a change in how 
mayors manipulate these for electoral ends. 
In order to explain why manipulation of deficit and not debt has 
continued after the law, it should be recalled that the law in question 
specifically prohibits local governments getting into debt, allowing 
them, instead, to liquidate budgets with a deficit on condition that 
this is compensated for in the budgets for the subsequent years. 
The findings for the manipulation of deficit are in line with those 
reported by several other studies. Buti and Van den Noord (2004), 
Mink and de Haan (2006), Von Hagen (2006) and Efthyvoulou (2011) 
conclude that the budgetary demands deriving from the Growth and 
Stability Pact have not meant the disappearance of electoral cycles 
in the euro-zone countries since the benefit to be had from breaking 
the pact outweighs the costs of non compliance. One explanation for 
the fact that the Budgetary Stability Act has not served to avoid the 
expansion of deficit, capital expenditure or current expenditure in 
election years is that Spanish local governments were well aware 
that non compliance carried no penalization. 
We therefore conclude that if the Budgetary Stability Act is to be 
fulfilled in all the years of a mandate there has to be some penalty 
clause to contain the incentives of politicians to manipulate 
budgetary variables in election years in order to favor re-election. 
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